Rudderless in a Storm:  The Russian Navy 1992-2002 by Tsypkin, Mikhail
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2002-12
Rudderless in a Storm:  The Russian
Navy 1992-2002
Tsypkin, Mikhail
Conflict Studies Research Centre
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/40272
 Conflict Studies Research Centre
B58
1
Rudderless in a Storm: The Russian Navy 1992-2002
Conflict Studies Research Centre
ISBN 1-904423-15-9
December 2002
Rudderless in a Storm:
The Russian Navy 1992-2002
Mikhail Tsypkin
This paper traces the decline in Russian naval capability over the last
decade.  It discusses the extent to which the Navy has succeeded in
remaining a "special case" in the reform process and its recent relationship
with President Putin.
The Russian navy has been dramatically reduced during the first post-Soviet
decade - but not reformed.  While the change of Russia’s geopolitical position in
1991-1992 was rapid and drastic, the Soviet navy's transformation into the Russian
navy has been slow and uncertain.  In place of real work to create a naval force
fully consistent with Russia’s requirements, the navy has all too frequently
preferred to wax nostalgic about the grandeur of the Soviet blue water navy, and to
try to turn these nostalgic images into hazy plans for the future.  The result is that
the new Russian state has an increasingly hollow force originally built for a global
oceanic struggle.1
The Facts
A few years ago the ships and aircraft of the Northern, Pacific, Black Sea and Baltic
Fleets, as well as of the Caspian Flotilla, were a naval force second only to that of
the United States.  On paper this is still true: Russia has an aircraft carrier Admiral
Kuznetsov, forty nuclear attack submarines, a dozen top-rated Kilo diesel
submarines, two nuclear guided missile cruisers and large numbers of smaller
ships; naval manpower is 171,500, and Russia continues to be a nuclear
superpower at sea.2  But the navy suffers from a severe malaise: it was cut rapidly
and brutally in the 1990s, officers are severely underpaid, there is not enough
money for operations, maintenance and training; and future shipbuilding
programmes are so much in doubt that Russian and foreign observers are talking
about the possible disappearance of the Russian navy.
The facts of a dramatic decline are indisputable.  By 1995, the navy had lost half its
squadrons and bases; by 1996, half its personnel (compared to the early 1990s) and
forty one per cent of its ships and sixty three per cent of its fixed wing and rotary
aircraft.3  By 2001, its order of battle was one third of that in 1992; ninety per cent
of its ships were in need of repair.4  By 2002, according to its Commander-in-Chief
(C-in-C) Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov, it was just over a quarter of the Soviet navy in
size.5
In 2000, the navy exercised even less than in 1999: 195 missile firing exercises (in
1999 - 315) and 368 anti-submarine warfare (ASW)/minesweeping exercises (1999 -




single ship sea duty, 1.5 days in tactically homogenous groups, and 0.5 days in
tactically mixed groups.7  Out of 584 naval aviation crews only 156 were combat
ready, and only 77 were ready for night flying; their average annual flying time was
21.7 hours (in 1999 it was 24 hours).  Average annual flying time for the crews of
naval missile carrying aircraft was 1.8 hours (in 1999 - 5 hours); for fighter crews -
7 hours (in 1999 - 19).8  The Admiral Kuznetsov made only one distant deployment,
and has spent the rest of the time being repaired at Sevmorput shipyard.  Only one
heavy nuclear missile cruiser, the Petr Velikiy, is combat ready.9  In 2001, one of
the last vestiges of Soviet global naval glory was abandoned, when President Putin
ordered the Russian naval base at Cam Rahn Bay shut down.
The sea-borne leg of Russia’s nuclear triad has also grown smaller.  The number of
nuclear submarines (SSBNs) declined from 62 in 1990 to 28 in 2000; the number of
warheads they carried also declined but not as steeply, from 2,804 to 2,336.10
According to a Western source, only 15 Russian SSBNs are operational.11
Reportedly not more than a quarter of the SSBN fleet is on patrol at any given
time.12
This is not yet a new, smaller navy consciously created in response to post Cold
War requirements, simply one reduced by attrition.  In fairness, one should note
that the drastic reduction was possibly more dramatic because throughout his
tenure (1956-1985) the late navy C-in-C Admiral Sergei Gorshkov reportedly
resisted decommissioning, so the Russian navy had first of all to retire ships which
had been kept in service much longer than necessary.13  Thus, the overall loss of
combat strength may not be as catastrophic as the Russian navy makes it sound.
At the same time, ships which had been in service for only ten to twelve years have
had to be decommissioned because there is no money to repair them.14  Even
though the navy manages to keep several SSBNs on patrol, conduct exercises, send
some ships on foreign visits, and participate in international activities (such as
maintaining sanctions against Iraq), the overall decline is obvious.
The navy suffers from serious crime problems, both corruption among the officers
and violence among the enlisted men.  In September 1998, a seaman killed several
of his crewmates and barricaded himself in a submarine.  In the same month,
conscripts guarding the navy's nuclear test range at Novaya Zemlya mutinied and
took schoolchildren and their teachers hostage.  In August 1999, two seamen
attacked a sentry guarding a radioactive waste store at the Gremikha navy base on
the Kola Peninsula; in the ensuing shootout five seamen were killed.15  Severe
hazing of conscripts is taken for granted; so are malnutrition and mistreatment by
officers.
Politics & Navy in Russia: An Inconvenient Marriage
Russians tend to view their future though the prism of their history.  The navy’s top
thinkers are well versed in the history of their service - and are not very comfortable
with it, despite their claims of past naval glory.  Political leaders showered the navy
with attention only to neglect it when other needs of state arose.  The happy - and
only - exception is Peter the Great, whose passionate commitment to the Russian
navy and maritime expansion is beyond doubt.  Prominent in his efforts to open up
the Baltic and Black seas to Russia, important in Russia’s campaigns against
Turkey under Catherine the Great later in the eighteenth century, the navy made
no contribution to the signal achievement of Russian power - the victory over
Napoleon in 1812-1815.
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Later, the Russian navy was victorious at Sinop over an adversary in decline, the
Turkish navy.  In the Crimean war of 1854-56, which Russia lost, the Russian
command sank its outmoded ships in order to block the entrance of Sevastopol
harbour.16  It took more than twenty years after that defeat for the navy to
demonstrate innovative spirit by carrying out the first successful torpedo attack
against a Turkish ship in 1877.17  This was followed by a naval buildup which
culminated in one of the worst naval defeats in history, at the hands of the
Japanese in the Tsushima Straits in 1904.  That disaster was followed by another
attempt to build a blue water navy which resulted in some successful designs, such
as the Novik class destroyer, which could make 37.3 knots in 1913,18 but was
abandoned at the outset of the First World War, in which the navy played a minor
role supporting ground operations.  An eminent Russian naval historian who had
seen action in World War II as a naval officer, Dr Korneliy Shatsillo, believed that
Russia’s attempt to build a blue water navy in the years preceding World War I
wasted resources needed for the army and thus contributed to Russia’s poor
performance in that war.19
This does not mean that the navy made no impact on the political fortunes of the
empire in the early twentieth century - quite the contrary.  It was not, however,
through action on high seas, but through mutinies, such as the one on the
battleship Potemkin, which slaughtered its officers in 1905 and became a symbol of
Russian revolution.  In 1917 and 1918, the sailors of Kronstadt descended on the
streets of Petrograd to terrorize the democratic Provisional Government, help propel
Lenin into power, and disband the first freely elected Russian Constituent
Assembly.  Once the Bolsheviks removed the capital from the shores of the Baltic to
land-locked Moscow, sailors' ability to play politics was reduced, and their desire to
do so was extinguished when the Red Army and secret police crushed the sailors of
Kronstadt who decided in 1921 that they no longer liked Bolsheviks and rose
against them.
The communist revolution and civil war (a strictly land affair) destroyed the Russian
navy; its rebuilding began only during the industrialization of the late 1920s-1930s;
the initial plans were for a navy primarily equipped with submarines, smaller
surface ships and aircraft to protect the Soviet coastline, the longest in the world.
Only in 1937 did Stalin order construction of a blue water navy.20  This programme
was curtailed in 1940 as war against Germany looked increasingly inevitable; once
Germany attacked in 1941, the programme was cancelled completely in favour of
building smaller ships that could help support ground forces' flanks, interdict lines
of communication in the Baltic and Black Seas, and conduct short range convoy
escorts in the North; all missions performed without particular distinction.21
After World War II Stalin again decided to build a blue water navy, but would not
open the state coffers to build aircraft carriers.  His successor, Nikita Khrushchev,
not only did not want to build carriers, but did his best to get rid of surface ships;
he wanted the navy to deploy nuclear armed ballistic missiles on as many
submarines as possible, and initiated a crash submarine construction programme.
The Soviet navy's golden era began three years after Khrushchev’s removal with the
appointment of Marshal Andrei Grechko as Minister of Defence in 1967.  In the
aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, which painfully exposed the Soviet lack of
power projection capability, the navy C-in-C Admiral Gorshkov, with the help of
Marshal Grechko, convinced the new team in the Kremlin that a navy with a global
reach was the perfect instrument for implementing their imperial ambitions.22  A




World to the dismay of Western politicians, and debating the intentions of Admiral
Gorshkov became a steady occupation for US naval intelligence analysts.  Finally,
the Soviet navy fulfilled its old dream and built a real carrier, the Admiral
Kuznetsov, but soon after its launch the USSR fell apart.
The Tale of Two Heroes
What inspiration can today’s Russian admiral draw from this history?  It is rich in
deeds of brilliant, courageous and patriotic officers.  What it lacks is a leader who
successfully translated the dream of naval glory into the language of political utility,
and made a lasting contribution to advancing Russia’s interests.  Many Russian
naval officers would object that Admiral Gorshkov was that kind of leader; indeed,
the current C-in-C Kuroyedov has chosen Gorshkov as an object of emulation.23
But Gorshkov operated within Brezhnev’s decadent regime, whose oligarchs he
learned to manipulate in order to build a blue-water navy that contributed nothing
to the wellbeing of Soviet citizens.  And even Gorshkov, according to Georgy
Arbatov, complained that government policy did not really correspond to the navy’s
needs.24  In his wake, Gorshkov left a disaster: his proud navy did not save the
USSR from collapse, and his naval buildup not only helped bankrupt the empire,
but led directly to today’s parlous condition, since appropriate support facilities
were not built.  The most glaring outcome is the lack of any serious plan for
decommissioning the huge fleet of nuclear submarines: more than 120 are rusting
in Russian bases, the fuel in their reactors a threat to the environment and navy
families, and an attractive target for terrorists and aspiring nuclear powers.
After the heroes of communism had been discredited, Russians needed a new
national hero.  The role was given to Marshal Georgy Zhukov, the top Soviet soldier
of World War II.  This choice, however, was a bitter pill for the navy, since Zhukov,
the ultimate army man, viewed the navy as of little importance to a continental
power like the USSR, helped Khrushchev resist the admirals' ambitions, and did
not disguise his contempt for the navy.  So, while the rest of Russia has chosen to
idolize Zhukov, the navy has selected Admiral Nikolai Kuznetsov.
Kuznetsov served as Stalin’s minister of the navy and navy C-in-C from 1939 until
1946, when he fell from favour, was reduced in rank to rear admiral and removed
from his job.  In 1951, Kuznetsov regained the dictator’s favour, and served as navy
minister until 1953.  Under Khrushchev, who abolished the naval ministry,
Kuznetsov served as navy C-in-C from 1953 to 1956, when Khrushchev fired him
for stubborn attempts to promote plans for a blue water navy.  Zhukov also fell
from grace twice, at about the same time as Kuznetsov, but he was feared by
politicians because of his popularity.  Kuznetsov suffered because he refused to
accept the views of civilian authorities on professional matters as final.25 In
contrast, Zhukov was an obedient, if sometimes grumbling and blunt, soldier of the
communist party.  Kuznetsov’s (and the navy’s) greatest combat achievement
resulted from an act of insubordination.  Before the German attack at dawn on 22
June 1941, hours before Stalin finally agreed to put the military on alert,
Kuznetsov, at his own risk, put the navy on full combat alert, an order credited by
Kuznetsov and his admirers for the small naval losses on the first day of the Great
Patriotic War.26  Thus, Kuznetsov’s legacy is one of frequent discord with civilian
authorities who did not understand the needs of the navy as the navy saw them.
Kuznetsov’s navy wanted to serve the nation - but the nation, or those who made
the decisions on its behalf, often found the price too steep.
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Navy & Politics in 1992-1999: Strategic Escapism
President Boris Yeltsin failed to give a clear sense of direction to the military as a
whole.  His primary interest in military affairs was in ensuring that the military
command would not take part in political intrigue against him, and would support
him against opponents if the need arose.  This policy was proven to work in October
1993, when the military suppressed, albeit reluctantly, the anti-Yeltsin Supreme
Soviet and its armed militants.  The navy, far from Moscow in its bases, could not
help or harm Yeltsin, and that reduced its clout.  Yeltsin was happy to use the navy
as a prop for a good photo opportunity, as in August 1998, when he ‘supervised’ an
exercise of the Northern Fleet, and in its course authorized the launch of a
submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM).27
Yeltsin failed to provide the navy with firm guidance regarding Russia’s place in the
world, and did not push energetically for reform of the armed forces.  Yeltsin started
with the notion that the US and Russia were equal, which allowed him to maintain
a superpower rhetoric useful for domestic consumption.  There was no realistic
treatment of how to maintain equality without anything approaching equal
resources.  By the mid 1990s it was clear that Yeltsin’s publicly declared belief that
Russia and the US were two global leaders was nothing but an illusion.  The
Russian political establishment responded with increasingly anti-Western
sentiment, culminating in something akin to a war panic during the Kosovo
campaign in 1999.  While President Yeltsin himself rarely engaged in such rhetoric,
he did not forcefully discourage it.
The National Security Concept approved by Yeltsin on December 17, 1997, steered
clear of open hostility to the West, but treated NATO's expansion as a threat to
Russian security, and American international predominance as something Russia
should work to change.  The Concept acknowledged that Russia’s international
influence was diminished, and warned that ‘a number of countries’ were trying to
further weaken Russia ‘politically, economically, and militarily’, although the threat
of direct military attack had decreased.28  For many officers brought up on the
dogmas of Marxism-Leninism and inevitable hostility between the USSR and the
West, this was Cold War Lite: politicians seemed to be going back to the good old
times.  If the military just held out without reform, many seemed to hope, the
government would eventually relent and fill the hollow post-Soviet military with
men and materiel.  Yeltsin’s government believed that a weak economy was the
main threat to Russia29 and would not increase defence spending, but their retreat
to Cold War Lite phraseology encouraged the military’s recalcitrance.
The navy was in a particularly difficult situation because its missions were closely
connected to Cold War policies.  In addition to its role as one of the legs of the
nuclear triad, the navy was supposed to destroy American SSBNs and carrier
groups, interdict NATO lines of communications, and assist the ground forces in
continental theatre offensives.30  It was also supposed to promote the Soviet
military-political offensive in the Third World by showing the flag and projecting
power.  The mission of protecting Russia’s coasts was moved far offshore, where
enemy ships were supposed to be ambushed.
Most of this made little sense after 1991.  The nuclear deterrence mission
remained, but in an increasingly downscaled version.  Other missions were simply
too expensive as well as unnecessary.  Russia’s troubles were in the south, where
the Black Sea Fleet was dramatically weakened by the prolonged fight with Ukraine




presence was limited to the Caspian Flotilla.  Just as the navy could not help
Yeltsin against the Supreme Soviet in 1993, it was not very useful in the wars in
Chechnya, only sending some naval infantrymen.
The political leadership, eager to avoid accusations of not supporting the military,
did not want to tell the navy directly that its role had been reduced.  Instead,
together with a Ministry of Defence and General Staff dominated by ground forces
and later strategic rocket forces officers, they simply cut the navy’s budget share.  A
knowledgeable correspondent reported that the navy’s share of the defence budget
declined from 23 per cent in 1993 to 9.2 per cent in 1998, and grew to only 11-12
per cent after 2000.31
Without firm political guidance, the navy developed its own interpretation of the
pre-revolutionary, Soviet, and current naval developments.  According to this, there
can be no valid reasons for making Russia do with a relatively small navy primarily
meant to defend its coasts.  Therefore, Russian naval history is a tale of a struggle
between wise blue water navy-loving patriots and navy-haters, unwise and
sometimes unpatriotic.  In this view, Russia did not build a blue-water navy in the
1920s because the leading military personalities Mikhail Frunze and Mikhail
Tukhachevskiy were ‘navy-haters’, and not because Russia lacked resources or
justification for such a major undertaking; Marshal Zhukov (who agreed with
Khrushchev’s refusal to build a ‘balanced’ blue water navy) was an ‘ignoramus’ in
naval matters, rather than someone who learned from World War II to be sceptical
about the navy’s strategic utility for Russia.32  The navy is proclaimed to be not just
a service of the armed forces, but a ‘bearer’ of Russia’s ‘wonderful … cultural and
religious traditions’.33  Thus, the navy becomes a national treasure in and of itself,
rather than a rational policy instrument.
Many politicians and the media eagerly embraced this sentimental vision: the worse
the conditions of sailors’ everyday lives, the more perilous every deployment on
poorly maintained ships, the more heated the civilian rhetoric about the historic
and future greatness of the Russian navy.  The navy understood the game: while
maintaining the semblance of subordination to civilian authority and their policy of
low funding, its command tolerated and perhaps even organized numerous appeals
by navy veterans, warning of the dire consequences of the blue-water navy's
decline.  Thus, for instance, a group of retired admirals appealed to Yeltsin in the
official Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Digest), warning of the growing threat from NATO,
emphasizing that the navy was ‘the only’ service capable of repelling Western
aggression from the sea, and demanding (and here is the crux of the matter) that
the navy be financed separately from the rest of the armed forces.  They also
demanded that the navy C-in-C report directly to the president, bypassing the
Minister of Defence and the General Staff.34
Marshal Sergeyev & The Navy
The first serious attempts to reform the navy began in May 1997, when Yeltsin,
having finally realized that without reform the military would disintegrate or rebel,
or both, appointed General (later Marshal) Igor Sergeyev as Minister of Defence with
a mandate to cut and restructure the armed forces.  Sergeyev appeared unmoved
by the myth of the navy as a national treasure; moreover, he made it clear that it
was the navy’s (and the military’s) refusal to shrink that was at the core of its
malaise.  In August and September 1997, the minister visited all the fleets; his
mission included ‘helping’ them conduct ‘organizational measures’ (language
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indicating that downsizing was discussed).  Visiting the Northern Fleet, Sergeyev
put his case bluntly: ‘We have a choice: either the structure and quantity of the
"sinking navy" and disintegrating army, or combat ready reformed Armed Forces.’35
Sergeyev’s policy was based on the belief that Russia could secure a breathing
space by relying on nuclear deterrence against any major nuclear or conventional
threat.  Conventional forces would be reduced until funding for new weapons
became available; a relatively small number of permanently ready units would be
sufficient to deal with the only plausible threat, that of local conflicts along Russia’s
periphery.  For the navy, it meant preservation - at gradually reduced levels - of its
SSBN force and assets to protect them, and to take part in local conflicts wherever
feasible.  This new policy was to be implemented by a new C-in-C, Admiral Vladimir
Kuroyedov, who had had a meteoric career path.  In February 1996 he was
promoted, after less than three years as chief of staff of the Baltic Fleet, to
command the Pacific Fleet; in July 1997, he was made chief of the Main Naval Staff
- first deputy C-in-C of the navy, and in November, its C-in-C.36
A limited but real structural reform was implemented in 1998-1999 in two sensitive
regions: Kaliningrad in the Baltic Sea and the Kamchatka peninsula in the Pacific.
In Kamchatka, the navy was to lead a joint command of naval forces (flotillas of
mixed forces and attack submarines), air defence and ground forces.  A joint
logistics system was also established.  This grouping is responsible for defending
the Kamchatka and Chukotka peninsulas, a huge expanse of territory.37  In the
process, the Pacific Fleet's structure was changed: ‘a squadron of ships, several
brigades of ground forces, and air supporting units were disbanded or reformed’.
‘Ten thousand’ servicemen were reassigned or discharged.38  Instead of separate
staffs for each service, the new grouping has a joint staff, commanded by a naval
officer, and assisted by three deputies, for naval forces, ground forces and
aviation.39  Similarly, in Kaliningrad the navy received under joint command ground
forces and air assets.
The change was controversial.  It gave the navy a boost of two joint commands in
strategically important regions, at the expense of the ground forces, who
traditionally predominated in joint commands.  In Kamchatka, the decision caused
open disobedience: ‘Lieutenant-General Mukhamed Batyrov, commander of the
25th [ground forces] Corps, publicly criticized the reforms prescribed by the General
Staff.’40  It took a visit from Admiral Kuroyedov to end the unprecedented public
conflict.
Kuroyedov initially demonstrated considerable political savvy.  He abandoned the
navy’s exaggerated rhetoric in favour of assigning it a realistic mission of creating
the ‘least favourable’ conditions for any maritime attack against Russia,41 and
acknowledged that Russia could not operate in the world oceans since it had
neither the necessary forces (with the exception of attack submarines), logistical
support, nor command and control systems in distant areas.  He softened the blow
by suggesting that naval theorists continue to ponder such operations.42
Kuroyedov also realized that in the economic and political circumstances it made
more sense to promote the concept of Russia’s general maritime rather than
narrowly naval interests.43
This moderate course was soon subjected to the severe shock of the war in Kosovo.
The main weakness of Sergeyev’s policy was that it required a pacific foreign policy.
Reliance on nuclear weapons could indeed save Russia from large scale aggression,




international politics.  The NATO campaign led to an eruption of anti-Western
sentiment among the Russian public and elites.  The greater the intensity of such
feelings, the more heated the rhetoric, the more frustrating the realization that
Russia had no instrument for influencing NATO.  No one seriously believed that
Russia would risk a nuclear war over Yugoslavia, and NATO was not going to take
Russia’s diminished conventional forces into consideration.  Sergeyev’s doctrine
had already been seriously damaged by the financial meltdown of August 1998,
which left the military with little prospect for conventional rearming, and Sergeyev’s
cherished strategic forces without a hope of keeping up with the US.  Sergeyev’s
doctrine was dead, because Russia did not want a foreign policy that kept it out of
global power politics.
The military reacted to this new mood with alacrity, although with little
effectiveness.  The stunt of sending paratroopers from the peacekeeping contingent
in Bosnia to seize the airport in Pristina brought international embarrassment
when the subsequent stages of the operation (flying reinforcements from Russia and
establishing a strong foothold in Kosovo) failed since no neighbouring nation would
give Russia overflight rights.  However, the episode played well at home, where the
media, in patriotic fervour, took the failure for a triumph, primarily because it
angered and frustrated NATO.44
Other military actions were less satisfactory, since they caused less visible
frustration.  Although some pundits in Moscow daydreamed scenarios of a naval
war between Russia and NATO in the Mediterranean, the dispatch of an intelligence
gathering ship and then of the ill-starred Kursk Oscar class cruise missile
submarine to the Mediterranean were hardly noticed in the West.  Still, Admiral
Kuroyedov insisted that the appearance of the Kursk in the area had ‘a considerable
international impact’, convinced NATO that Russia’s navy ‘was highly combat
ready’, that Russia continued to play ‘an important geostrategic role’ in the region,
and seriously ‘disturbed’ the NATO ASW forces.45  The Zapad 99 exercise in June
1999 purported to demonstrate how Russia would defend against a NATO attack,
and ended with two Bear bombers simulating a preemptive nuclear strike against
US territory; it was proclaimed by a respectable newspaper to have left the West in
a state of ‘shock’.46  The real impact was much more modest, but all these gestures
played well domestically.  A very few domestic observers quietly noted the crucial
fact that the slow and vulnerable bombers, without fighter support, were
intercepted by US F-15s from Iceland, which would in real life have made their
strike against the mainland impossible.47
The navy’s performance in Zapad 99 was less glorious than it wanted the public to
believe: it suffered from such a shortage of fuel that it had to keep in port two large
ships, and cut short the deployment of the new Admiral Chabanenko; an ASW
exercise had to be cancelled.  But what mattered for the navy was that it legitimized
the mission of destroying ships armed with long range land-attack cruise missiles.
Navy spokesmen, including the C-in-C, repeatedly stated that the NATO operation
in Yugoslavia heavily depended on sea-based cruise missiles, and that the only way
to defend Russia against this threat would be for its navy to go far enough into the
oceans to stop the US navy before it could deliver a strike against the Russian
homeland.
B58
Rudderless in a Storm: The Russian Navy 1992-2002
9
To The Bottom: The Kursk Disaster
On July 24, 2000, the recently elected President Putin found time to attend a
dissertation defence at the non-governmental Academy of Military Science.  A
degree of Candidate of Military Science (roughly equivalent to PhD) was sought by
Admiral Kuroyedov.  The topic of the dissertation was appropriately grand: The
State Strategy for the Defence and Realization of Russian National Interests in the
World Ocean.  The president reportedly took part in a lively debate on the merits of
the dissertation, after which the twenty one members of the Academy’s dissertation
council all voted in favour of awarding the degree.  But this was not the end of the
affair.  Once the President had congratulated Kuroyedov and left, the Council did
not disperse.  The dissertation’s sponsor - the Military Academy of the General Staff
- and several reviewers recommended that Kuroyedov be awarded the highest
degree of Doctor of Science (there is no Western equivalent), because he had
succeeded in solving a great ‘scientific problem’: he discovered the ‘methodology’ for
protecting Russia’s interests.  The council’s secret ballot was nineteen in favour,
two against.48
Sixteen days after this exceptional gesture of personal presidential involvement in
naval affairs, at 22:30 on August 10, the newest and one of the navy's most
powerful submarines, K-141 Kursk, left its base at Zapadnaya Litsa.  Its mission
was to take part in a major Northern Fleet exercise, simulating an attack against a
carrier battle group.  The Kursk was also to test new batteries which powered the
torpedoes to be used in the exercise.
The submarine sent its last report at 8:51 on 12 August; after launching a
simulated strike by 24 Shipwreck cruise missiles, the Kursk was ready for the next
phase of the exercise, a torpedo attack.  At 11:30 the Petr Velikiy registered an
unexplained underwater sound, followed by an even stronger one.  No action was
taken in response.  The planned torpedo attack by the Kursk was not carried out,
and the submarine did not report the reason for this failure.  It was only at 16:35
that the fleet attempted - and failed to establish - contact with the Kursk.  A search-
and-rescue mission was finally ordered at 18:14.49
The subsequent chain of events is well known: a doomed rescue attempt which
demonstrated painful technical and professional failings.  All 118 hands were lost.
The navy's immediate reaction was to mislead the public and civilian authority
about the progress of the rescue mission, and to blame the disaster on a collision
with a foreign submarine.  It took an investigation more than a year long for the
government to acknowledge that the only navy to blame was the Russian one.
President Putin and the Russian navy had been friends for some time: as deputy
chief of the presidential administration in 1997, Putin served on the military council
of the navy, an advisory body to the navy’s command; Putin has reportedly retained
his membership even as president.  Within months of Putin’s appointment in 1997,
navy C-in-C Admiral Felix Gromov was replaced by Admiral Kuroyedov; Putin might
have been in a position to influence this decision.  Judging by the speed with which
Putin’s relationship with the navy developed upon his selection as Yeltin’s
successor, Kuroyedov must have impressed Putin early on.
Putin’s policy has suffered from a fundamental contradiction.  One the one hand,
Putin wants to be seen as a leader rebuilding the might of the Russian state,
especially its military power.  He and his team have correctly calculated that this




On the other hand, Putin has claimed that Russia is poor and has to live according
to its means - this view appeared prominently in his election platform.  Nowhere did
he offer an explanation of how to make Russia mighty again on a shoestring
budget.50  Without clear guidance, the military naturally assumed that the anti-
Western atmosphere of 1999 would save them from finally adjusting to the post-
Cold War world.
Putin’s early actions encouraged this thinking.  In November 1999, he chaired a
meeting of the Russian Security Council which focused on Russia’s maritime
problems; Putin reportedly voiced concern about Russia losing its position, saying
that Russia became a great power only when it became a great maritime power.51
Putin had demonstrated his mettle as supreme C–in–C in April 2000, taking part in
a Northern Fleet exercise aboard a Delta IV SSBN, and spending the night - the first
Russian or Soviet leader to do so.  A defence correspondent called this a ‘successful
tactical move’ by the navy’s command, which used the occasion to lobby for more
funds to restore to operational condition the Typhoon SSBNs, and to plan
deployment of a task force to the Mediterranean later that year.52
On January 10, 2000, Putin signed a new National Security Concept.  Its ‘principal
point’ was ‘that military threats to Russia [were] on the increase and the main
danger emanate[d] from the West’.53  On March 3, Putin signed a directive On
Russia's Maritime Activity and an associated document ponderously entitled 'The
Foundations of Naval Policy of the Russian Federation Until the Year 2010'.54  This
was the product of the navy’s struggle throughout the 1990s for greater autonomy
from the Ministry of Defence and General Staff.  Their motivation, apparently, was -
once again - to obtain a separate budget.55  The ‘Foundations’ were initially
supposed to be the Naval Strategy.56  A separate naval strategy, however, would
have been an open break with the Soviet approach, which emphasized joint strategy
and did not allow individual services to claim strategies of their own.  The navy did
not get its own strategy - the military doctrine signed by Putin on April 21 speaks
about ‘joint strategic and operational planning of employment of the armed forces’;
the high command, when preparing the doctrine's final draft, excluded the section
on naval strategy.57  Nevertheless, the doctrine refers to the ‘Foundations’ as
guiding Russia’s actions in defending its maritime interests.58  No other service
received such special mention.
Kuroyedov did not lose all hope of a special place for the navy.  Shortly after he
defended his dissertation, he published a scholarly essay on maritime strategy
(morskaya strategiya).59  This term implies in Russian an approach substantially
broader than purely military.  Kuroyedov maintained that Russia's maritime
strategy should help it achieve practical results in the shortest possible time;
language close to Putin’s arguments that Russia’s first task is to improve its
economic situation.  Unlike his predecessors, who bombarded President Yeltsin
with demands to counter the US navy ship for ship, Kuroyedov offered to counter
any naval threat by flexibly adjusting the available Russian naval ‘combat systems’
to enable them to disrupt enemy operations.  The Russian navy should no longer be
required to maintain global presence: its regular missions should be limited to the
Arctic, North Atlantic, Baltic and Black Seas, and the north western Pacific Ocean.
This progressive message, however, was contradicted by the essay's traditional
views.  In reality, Kuroyedov had nothing to offer the economy except more
government spending on the navy.  There was no place for market mechanisms in
Kuroyedov’s vision: maritime development can help economic growth only if ‘the
Russian state plays a leading role’, while the navy spearheads development and
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implementation of maritime policy.  Couched in the excessively scholastic
terminology of Soviet military science, it is the same old threat assessment: Russia
is threatened from the sea.  This threat is truly global.  Russia naturally needs a
‘balanced’ navy (ie, blue water, equipped with all classes of ships).  Just as
President Putin was sending a series of contradictory political messages to the
nation and the armed forces (liberal economics in an illiberal state, closer alliance
with the West and nostalgia for superpower grandeur, etc), Kuroyedov was
responding with a contradictory maritime strategy.
These messages help explain the policy origins of the Kursk disaster, and the
admirals' subsequent conduct.  The decision to send a group of ships, including the
Kursk, to the Mediterranean, was the direct result of an openly anti-Western
orientation after the Kosovo conflict.  This orientation seemed to be good public
relations for the president, who ‘want[ed] to lead a strong … power, and view[ed] the
navy as a symbol of this strength’.60  The idea that the navy was the best
instrument for promoting Russia's international influence without firing a shot was
forcefully put forward by Vice-Admiral Mikhail Motsak.61  Motsak’s argument was a
slightly updated version of the ideas of Admiral Gorshkov, and was very much in
line with other resurrections of Soviet strategic dogmas attempted in the late 1990s.
Kuroyedov himself penned an admiring anniversary article about Gorshkov in
January 2000.62
The navy saw Putin’s interest as an opportunity to advance individual and
corporate self-interest.  After the Pristina adventure had been treated as a heroic
deed, the admirals had good reason to believe that the strategically senseless
deployment to the Mediterranean would bring them rewards.  Had Kuroyedov
reported the truth about the disastrous condition of the navy, Putin might not have
authorized the deployment, or the preceding exercise, thus foreclosing the navy's
first opportunity for higher status and better budget since the mid-1980s.  And the
terrible condition of the navy was obvious to its C-in-C: Kuroyedov’s lead article in
the first issue of the Naval Digest for 2000 was dedicated specifically to preventing
ship accidents.63
Once real disaster struck the Kursk, the navy’s chain of command, led by
Kuroyedov, misinformed not only the public (hardly extraordinary in Russia), but
the Supreme C-in-C Putin himself.  Putin was reportedly told that the Russian navy
had all necessary means for rescuing survivors, and that no foreign aid was
necessary.  While it is unlikely that foreign rescuers could have saved any sailors,
the navy’s stonewalling and lies helped create an image of a president indifferent to
the lives of Russian servicemen.  On 15 August, the navy’s leaders, including
admirals Kuroyedov and Popov, began to blame the disaster on a collision with a US
or British submarine.64  This theory, picked up by the Russian media and some of
Putin’s political allies,65 created diplomatic complications: after vigorous denials
from abroad, there was nothing Putin could do further, while the continuing
accusations made Putin look weak.  The navy’s behaviour was consistent with their
insistence that the West continued to be Russia’s main enemy, a mindset
encouraged by the National Security Concept and Military Doctrine.
A Recovery?
The Kursk tragedy demonstrated that the Russian navy was in no condition to show
the flag on the high seas.  The planned deployment to the Mediterranean was




could not even afford the necessary repairs and maintenance for all the ships
scheduled to deploy.66  This was the first step away from the escapism of the 1990s;
the subsequent development of Russia's naval policy has been, to paraphrase
Lenin, half-a-step forward, one-quarter of a step back.  Putin has had to deal with
two obvious problems: the first, prevention of another disaster and reestablishing
order and responsibility in the naval command; the second - determination of the
navy's future shape.
Putin refused to punish anyone until the investigation was complete.  Since the
Kursk was at the bottom of the Barents Sea, this had to wait until October 2001,
when the submarine was raised by Dutch and Norwegian companies with
participation from the Russian navy.  Observers noted that the navy leadership
were quite reluctant to raise the submarine, since that would make the day of
reckoning closer.  As the Kursk was raised, Admiral Kuroyedov, followed by other
high-ranking officers, again blamed a ‘foreign submarine’ for the disaster.67  It did
not take investigators long to establish what had not happened.  On 1 December
2001, the Prosecutor General Vladimir Ustinov presented a preliminary report to
Putin, in the presence of Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin and
Kuroyedov.  At the meeting Putin stated that there were no indications of a collision
between the Kursk and any other ship.68 Next day, more than a dozen high-ranking
Norther Fleet officers, including commander Admiral Vyacheslav Popov and chief of
staff Vice-Admiral Motsak, were reprimanded and sent into retirement.69
The President’s wrath, however, was quite restrained.  'After having been sacked,
Vyacheslav Popov became a representative for Murmansk province in the
Federation Council … Mikhail Motsak got a job [as the first deputy] of Victor
Cherkesov’, the president’s representative to the Northwestern Federal District.70
Kuroyedov was not disciplined at all.  None of the three have disavowed their earlier
version of the disaster - that the Kursk was sunk by a foreign submarine.
Moreover, Admiral Popov has been reported as insisting, even after Putin’s
pronouncement, that the investigators look for the remnants of a US MK-48 torpedo
in the wreck, an escalation of his accusation from an accidental collision to that of
an attack and premeditated murder!71  The final results of the investigation clearly
indicated that the culprit was an explosion of one of the Kursk's torpedoes.72
Putin’s sensitivity to the navy has also been demonstrated by the handling of the
results of the investigation: the government has not released a detailed report
because it is mostly classified.  Still, the crew's relatives were allowed, according to
official sources, access to all investigative materials, including classified ones.
Excerpts from the materials were leaked in August 2002 by the official Russian
Gazette (Rossiyskaya Gazeta) - without any protest from the administration - which
pinpointed a whole series of violations of regulations by officers and sailors, and by
the shipbuilding industry.73  Crucial safety equipment was not properly maintained;
the exercise plan lacked proper orders for organizing search and rescue missions,
the Northern Fleet command ignored the instruction of the Main Naval Staff to
conduct, in August 2000, a submarine rescue exercise; Popov took too long to
declare an emergency; the exercise was very poorly organized; there was a suspicion
that signatures to a number of documents had been forged, etc.74  Despite such
serious violations, a decision was reached not to prosecute anybody.
Shaping the future navy has turned out to be no more straightforward than Putin’s
handling of the disaster.  ‘There has not been a serious debate on the size and
composition of a navy that would be affordable and sustainable in the second
decade of the post-Cold war era.’75  The president appeared to continue with his
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pre-disaster naval policy.  On 27 May 2001, Putin signed a Maritime Doctrine,
evidently based on Kuroyedov's ideas, which emphasizes the economic benefits that
Russia should gain from maritime activity, but is quite vague about practical
details.76  This lengthy quasi-scholarly document was aptly characterized by two
retired Russian navy officers as nothing more than ‘a wish to return Russia to the
world ocean before other powers divide its riches’.77
The next project reportedly based on Kuroyedov’s dissertation was creation of a
Maritime Collegium,.78 Modelled after Admiralteystv-kollegiya, a body established by
Peter the Great to oversee Russia’s maritime affairs, it is supposed to implement the
Maritime Doctrine.  According to some reports, the navy command saw this as a
quasi-ministry of the navy, capable of bypassing the navy-haters in the Ministry of
Defence and dealing directly with the navy-friendly president.80  If Kuroyedov had
such dreams, the reality was disappointing.  The formation of the collegium was
entrusted to Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who discovered that the new state
body was of interest to other players - the fishing industry, shipbuilders, the
merchant marine, governors of coastal provinces, and arms exporters.  An initial
draft presented by Kasyanov to Putin in early September 2001 listed as members
representatives of so many interests that the president turned it down.79  When
Putin approved the statutes several days later, the collegium was to be chaired by
the prime minister himself; his first deputy there was to be the First Deputy Prime
Minister in charge of the defence industry Ilya Klebanov, and his deputies were the
Minister of Economic Development German Gref, the Minister of Defence Sergei
Ivanov, and Admiral Kuroyedov.80  The chairman and all his other deputies
outranked the navy C-in-C.  It seems that Putin chose to take Kuroyedov’s thesis of
the economic importance of the ocean to heart - and the navy has been left without
any special leverage in the new body.
Meanwhile, the future shape of the navy has remained in doubt.  The ‘Foundations’
of March 2000 made a modest effort at defining what types of ships Russia would
have to buy, and what kinds of missions they would carry out.  The navy is
supposed to deter both nuclear and conventional attack on Russia.  Nuclear
deterrence continues to be all-important, and buying new SSBNs, modernizing and
maintaining existing ones, and buying missiles for them are designated as priorities
for the navy’s weapons acquisition programme.  The defence of coastal waters
becomes more important, to be achieved by attack submarines and ‘multipurpose’
surface ships.  The ‘Foundations’ insist that Russia will need aircraft carriers -
logical if the navy is to deploy, as proposed, to distant seas if a threat to Russia
emerges there, but an impossible demand on Russia’s economy.81
The economic situation makes most of these plans look unrealistic for the
immediate and mid-term future.  Even the most clear and well established mission
- nuclear deterrence - is in trouble.82  The navy has not received a single new SSBN
since 1992.  Only one is being built, the Yuri Dolgorukiy of the Borey class.
Construction began in 1996, and is not likely to be completed before 2005.83  The
Typhoon and Delta III SSBNs were bought between 1976 and 1989; the newer Delta
IVs joined the fleet in 1985-1991.84  The service life of an SSBN is twenty to twenty
five years.85  With no maintenance, it may be as short as ten to fifteen years.86
Further, the SSBN fleet is threatened by the lack of replacement SLBMs, whose
service life is ten years.  The Makeyev Missile Centre, the main SLBM contractor,
has experienced significant delays in its attempts to build a new missile to replace
the SS-N-20 on the Typhoons and to arm the future Yuri Dolgorukiy.  While




27 to be used as an SLBM.  The attempt, which favoured the strategic rocket forces'
contractor, the Institute of Thermal Technology, did not succeed, but disrupted the
naval contractor's work.  Now the navy may have to abandon its five largest SSBNs,
the Typhoons, and rely on the remaining seven Delta-IVs as the sea-based leg of the
nuclear triad.  This will require eventual replacement of the SS-N-23 SLBM with the
new RSM-54 Sineva, a ‘radical … modification with 10 instead of 4 warheads, and
more sophisticated satellite navigation, command computer, and anti-ABM
systems’.87
Throughout the 1990s, there were a number of changes in the posture of the
strategic nuclear forces.  The relative importance of the land based ICBMs and the
navy’s SLBMs was at the centre of a fierce debate over very scarce resources.
Sergeyev's appointment as minister of defence was not as detrimental to the navy’s
nuclear role as is often imagined.  In July 1998, the Security Council decided to
emphasize the sea-based leg of the triad, decreeing that its share would increase
from thirty to fifty per cent of Russia’s strategic nuclear arsenal.88  Still, Sergeyev
put most of the acquisition budget into buying land-based ICBMs.  With Putin’s
accession, the navy’s budget started growing, albeit slowly, and the navy’s
argument that its submarines provide for the most secure nuclear posture has been
reaffirmed by the General Staff, which announced in January 2001 that the naval
deterrent will play the leading role in future.89
No one is asking (at least, in public) an obvious question: since Russia is soon likely
to have fewer than a dozen SSBNs in its arsenal, and only a quarter of those
combat ready at any given time, and since the Kursk disaster demonstrated that
Russian submarines are not very safe, could an accident to just one SSBN
significantly reduce Russia’s strategic nuclear forces?  The Strategic Offensive
Reduction Treaty (SORT), signed by the US and Russia in Moscow in May 2002,
which allows Russia considerable leeway in reducing its strategic arsenal, may
alleviate the pressure on Russia to keep up the numbers of its sea-based weapons,
but the inability to complete construction of even one SSBN in more than ten years
makes one wonder about the future of its sea-based systems.
The situation with other classes of ships is not much better.  Throughout the
1990s, the navy received only ships ordered by or designed for the Soviet navy to
fight NATO on the high seas: nuclear submarines (such as the Gepard that joined
the navy in 2002 after eleven years at the shipyard), heavy nuclear missile cruisers,
large ASW ships, destroyers.  The navy also has some newer acquisitions.  The keel
of the new corvette Steregushchiy was laid in 2001; it is expected to join the navy in
2005.  It is planned to lay the keel of another ship of the same class in 2003.  The
frigate Yaroslav Mudryy is eighty per cent complete after fourteen years of
construction; another frigate, the Tatarstan, joined the navy after twelve years of
construction.90  The modest financial boost given to the navy has resulted in some
acquisition progress, but much more needs to be done if Russia is not to lose in the
not too distant future the capability to defend its coastal waters, not to mention the
more distant ‘approaches to its shores’, a mission that, in the eyes of the navy
planners, requires aircraft carriers.91
A number of factors have kept the navy command clinging to such Cold War
missions as repelling an attack by a US carrier group from the Norwegian Sea.
There are the inertia of thinking and self-interested conservatism.  There is also the
irresistible attraction of focusing the navy’s plans on missions that require existing
assets - and they are concentrated in the Northern and Pacific Fleets, which have
only their old Cold War enemies to worry about.  (To be fair, the situation in the
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Pacific is more complex, but currently the main threat to Russian interests there is
poaching.) These are reasons internal to the navy.  There is also a very important
reason external to the navy: the Russian government has been unable to devise a
foreign policy that could firmly convey a message to the military that their Cold War
ideas belong in the archives, not in threat assessments92 and operational plans.
Telling the military that Russia has no enemies is not enough - the political leaders
should have filled this ambiguous vacuum with alliances capable of supporting the
Russian state in its current weakened condition.
Putin has made some progress in this direction, especially after the September
2001 terrorist attacks.  His good relationship with President Bush, and the
considerable strategic capital gained from a small investment in Central
Asia,apparently encouraged Putin to look towards the threat and opportunities in
the south.  For several years, while the media, politicians, and retired officers were
bemoaning the fate of the great blue water navy, the very unglamorous Caspian
Flotilla has actually increased its size, according to some sources, by two and a half
times: most of the small patrol craft built in recent years were sent to the flotilla,
which has also been reinforced by several small ships transferred from the Black
and Baltic Seas.  The new frigate Tatarstan joined the Caspian Flotilla.93 A small
force consisting of two frigates, twelve major patrol craft and fifty smaller craft can
have a serious impact in this sensitive and important area.94
This dynamism is obviously linked to the economic importance of the Caspian, the
conflicting claims of several states on its energy resources, and its proximity to the
volatile Caucasus and Central Asia.  After an unsuccessful summit of Caspian
basin states in April 2002, Putin ordered Kuroyedov to conduct a major exercise
there.95  (Of course, an exercise of this size had to be planned well beforehand, but
Putin used it as a political gesture after the summit had failed to resolve the littoral
states' differences.)  The naval exercise was conducted on August 8-15, 2002; its
main goal was protection of economic facilities against terrorism, and the navy
(including naval infantry) was joined by ground and air forces, Interior Ministry
troops, etc.96  Two weeks later, during his visit to the Pacific Fleet, Putin praised the
Caspian exercise, with its focus on counter-terrorism and economic security, as the
model for other fleets to follow.97 He named two main missions for the Pacific Fleet:
nuclear deterrence and protection of Russia's maritime border,98 both compatible
with a realistic approach to what the navy can do for Russia today.
This naval version of ‘small is beautiful’ is not going to flourish easily in the Main
Naval Staff.  While preparations for the Caspian exercise were in their last stage,
Kuroyedov marked Navy Day by an article entitled 'We Are an Oceanic Power',
claiming that the US and NATO were out to weaken Russia militarily, removing it as
an economic competitor, and that this disaster could only be prevented by Russia
regaining its status as a ‘great naval power’.  He named the mission of defending
against US aircraft carriers and long-range sea-launched cruise missiles as the
navy’s top priority.99
How can this backsliding occur, and what does it really mean?  Civil-military
relations in Russia, after attempts of the first half of the 1990s to bring civilian
experts into public debates on military affairs, have become increasingly a private
dialogue between the supreme C-in-C, President Putin, and his soldiers and sailors.
The navy C-in-C is not responsible to anyone but the president, and Putin's
pronouncements are likely to send confusing signals to the navy and the tax-




likely to continue to be buffeted by capricious winds, rudderless in the stormy seas
of post-communist politics.
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